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INTRODUCTION 
 This case involves a question of exceptional importance with implications 
for all Lanham Act cases involving online marketing, including a panel decision 
that conflicts with precedent from other U.S. Courts of Appeals. This Court 
recognized, for the first time, initial-interest confusion under the Lanham Act, 
which has fallen out of favor around the country as internet searches become 
increasingly ubiquitous. It brings the Court into conflict with other Circuits, relying 
on caselaw that is dated and inapplicable to internet marketing today. 
Initial-interest confusion relates to when potential consumer confusion 
between two marks is actionable. The district court in this case correctly concluded 
that Plaintiff needed to show that consumers were confused about the source of the 
goods—expensive, air adjustable beds, sometimes called “number beds”—at the 
time they made a purchase, not when they first encountered the marks. Practically 
speaking, this meant Plaintiff would need to show confusion about the source when 
a consumer bought a mattress from Defendants (either online or over the phone), 
not when the consumer performed a search for a mattress using a search engine 
and clicked on Defendants’ advertising. This Court made search results and a 
single click actionable. In more recent years, courts have been “heavily criticized 
for expanding initial-interest confusion doctrine into Internet cases in which the 
case for any consumer harm is doubtful.” Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. 
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Supp. 2d 450, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation omitted). Indeed, the only cases 
cited in the panel decision supporting its recognition of initial-interest confusion 
date back at least twenty years. Op.1 at 8 (citing Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check 
Point Software Technologies, Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987); Dorr-Oliver, 
Inc. v. Fluid Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996)). Internet marketing—and 
consumers’ level of sophistication encountering it—has no doubt changed 
dramatically in that time. See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. 
Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We must be acutely 
aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; 
emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”) (citation omitted); see also 
Ascentive, LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (declining to apply initial-interest 
confusion, noting “the technological landscape today is vastly different than it was 
in 1999”).  
Moreover, when asked at oral argument before the panel, counsel for Select 
Comfort could not identify one piece of evidence Select Comfort was prevented 
from introducing due to the initial-interest confusion decision. The jury heard all of 
the evidence and reached its conclusion of no infringement. Given the potential for 
plaintiffs in this Circuit to use this decision to weaponize common Internet 
 
1 References to the panel decision are abbreviated throughout as “Op.” 
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advertising practices in future litigation, and the inconsistency between this Circuit 
and others, Defendants/Cross-Appellants Dires, LLC, Scott Stenzel, and Craig 
Miller respectfully request that this Court grant rehearing en banc. 
BACKGROUND 
In its effort to take down one of its only remaining competitors in the air 
adjustable bed market, Select Comfort Corporation and Select Comfort SC 
Corporation (collectively, “Select Comfort”) brought this lawsuit against Dires, 
LLC, known commercially as Personal Comfort Bed, and two of its owners, Craig 
Miller and Scott Stenzel, along with former owner John Baxter (collectively, “the 
Dires Parties”) in 2012, relating primarily to the Dires’ Parties online advertising 
of its beds that compete directly with Select Comfort’s.  
On summary judgment, the district court stated, “Plaintiffs trademark 
infringement claim will require Plaintiffs to establish a likelihood of actual 
confusion at the time of purchase.” Op. at 5–6.2  
At trial, Select Comfort presented exactly the same evidence as it would 
have had the Court not made its ruling regarding initial-interest confusion. When 
asked at oral argument before this Court, counsel for Select Comfort could not 
identify one piece of evidence Select Comfort was prevented from introducing due 
to the summary-judgment decision. The testimony showed that when the Dires 
 
2 Although the court included this language in a summary-judgment opinion, the 
order itself does not dispose of or decide any claims or defenses in the action. 
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Parties’ ads appeared in search engine results, consumers could click on those ads 
(at a cost to the Dires Parties) and be taken to the Personal Comfort Bed website.  
Following a three-week trial, the jury agreed with the Dires Parties and 
found no infringement. Nonetheless, a panel of this Court adopted an outdated 
standard while ignoring the lessons learned in other Circuits and determined for the 
first time that (1) this Circuit recognizes initial-interest confusion and (2) initial-
interest confusion should apply in this internet marketing case. It reversed and 
remanded for a new trial on Select Comfort’s claim of trademark infringement.3 
REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING  
I. This Court’s Decision Conflicts with Decisions of Other Courts of  
  Appeals That Have Considered the Issue. 
 
Prior to this decision, initial-interest confusion “has never been adopted by 
the Eighth Circuit[.]” Sensient Techs. Corp. v. SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 
754, 764 & 766 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to adopt initial-interest confusion). The 
Sensient court held that it does not apply where consumer sophistication and 
degree of purchasing care are both high. Id.  
Other courts around the country have refused to adopt initial-interest 
confusion doctrine as defined here. The panel decision relied on the Ninth Circuit’s 
formulation of initial-interest confusion from Brookfield as cited by McCarthy: 
 
3 The panel also reversed on one issue about false advertising claims appealed by 
the Dires Parties. It declined to reverse as to Select Comfort’s other eight issues. 
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“confusion that creates initial customer interest, even though no actual sale is 
finally completed as a result of the confusion.” Op. at 8. But Brookfield has been 
“roundly criticized by courts and commentators.” Ascentive, LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d 
at 466 (citing Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litig. as Consumer Conflict, 86 
N.Y.U.L.REV. 60, 86 (2008) (citations omitted) (noting that “Brookfield and its 
progeny have been heavily criticized for expanding initial interest confusion 
doctrine into Internet cases in which the case for any consumer harm is 
doubtful”); Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034–35 
(9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (noting that Brookfield was “wrongly 
decided,” and “has been widely criticized as inapplicable to the internet situation, 
given both the fact that customers were not misdirected and the minimal 
inconvenience in directing one’s web browser back to the original list of search 
results”); see also Ascentive, LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (“The Court agrees with 
the criticism that the harm caused by initial interest confusion in the internet 
context is minimal as “with one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a 
viewer can return to the search engine's results and resume searching for the 
original website.””) (quoting Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000)); Eric Goldman, Technology & Marketing Law Blog, “Eighth Circuit 
Embraces the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine. What??? UGH. No. Why??? – 
Select Comfort v. Baxter,” (https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/05/eighth-
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circuit-embraces-the-initial-interest-confusion-doctrine-what-ugh-no-why-select-
comfort-v-baxter.htm) (May 13, 2021) (“This opinion is a good candidate for a 
rehearing en banc. The opinion creates avoidable doctrinal trouble, and other 
judges on the Eighth Circuit should demand a tighter opinion with fresher citations 
(if not a completely different result).”) 
Although other Courts of Appeals have recognized initial-interest confusion 
as actionable, the panel decision conflicts with numerous decisions. Beginning 
with the Ninth Circuit—the first to apply initial-interest confusion in the internet 
context—Defendants/Cross-Appellants here outline the conflicts between the panel 
decision and the decisions of numerous other Courts of Appeals. 
A. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit  
Even the Ninth Circuit has criticized Brookfield’s formulation of the 
doctrine as adopted by the panel decision. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc., one judge 
called Brookfield “wrongly decided,” stating, “I do not think it is reasonable to find 
initial interest confusion when a consumer is never confused as to source or 
affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset that a product or 
web link is not related to that of the trademark holder because the list produced by 
the search engine so informs him.” 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, 
J., concurring). 
Appellate Case: 19-1077     Page: 13      Date Filed: 05/24/2021 Entry ID: 5038725 
 7 
The Ninth Circuit then reversed a grant of a preliminary injunction based on 
the Brookfield formulation in Network Automation, Inc., 638 F.3d at 1148, a case 
strikingly similar to this matter, which considered “whether the use of another’s 
trademark as a search engine keyword to trigger one’s own product advertisement 
violates the Lanham Act.” In discussing the application of Brookfield, the Ninth 
Circuit stated: 
While the district court analyzed each of the Sleekcraft [likelihood of 
confusion] factors, it identified the three most important factors as (1) 
the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or 
services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing 
channel, for any case addressing trademark infringement on the 
Internet…However, we did not intend Brookfield to be read so 
expansively as to forever enshrine these three factors—now often 
referred to as the “Internet trinity” or “Internet troika”—as the test for 
trademark infringement on the Internet. Brookfield was the first to 
present a claim of initial interest confusion on the Internet; we 
recognized at the time it would not be the last, and so emphasized 
flexibility over rigidity. Depending on the facts of each specific case 
arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as more illuminating 
on the question of consumer confusion. 
 
Id. The Network Automation court specifically noted the importance of the degree 
of consumer care in the internet context, stating that (even a decade ago), “[w]e 
have recently acknowledged that the default degree of consumer care is becoming 
more heightened as the novelty of the Internet evaporates and online commerce 
becomes commonplace.” Id. at 1152 (citing Toyota Motor Sales v. Tabari, 610 
F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010)). Moreover, the court stated it “expect[s] consumers 
searching for expensive products online to be even more sophisticated.” Network 
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Automation, Inc., 638 F.3d at 1153. The Network Automation court held that the 
district court erred by concluding that the “type of purchaser and degree of care” 
factor in the context of internet marketing weighed in favor of a finding of 
infringement and reversed. Id.  
Recent opinions in the Ninth Circuit confirm this narrowing. See, e.g., 
Moore v. Doe, No. CV 20-6569-DMG (SPX), 2020 WL 6804508, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 13, 2020) (“courts have since narrowed Brookfield to not apply where the 
displayed search result is not likely to confuse the consumer as to its source”) 
(citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 354 F.3d at 1035; Network Automation, Inc., 638 
F.3d at 1147–48 (citing Judge Berzon’s opinion)). 
B. U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit  
The First Circuit has not recognized initial-interest confusion as actionable. 
See Smartling, Inc. v. Skawa Innovation Ltd., 358 F. Supp. 3d 124, 141 (D. Mass. 
2019) (“the First Circuit has yet to adopt this concept.”) (citing Concordia 
Partners, LLC v. Pick, No. 2:14-CV-009-GZS, 2015 WL 4065243, at *9 n.7 (D. 
Me. July 2, 2015); Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Panayotov, No. CIV.A. 12-12262-
GAO, 2014 WL 949830, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 2014) (“However, even if [the 
initial interest] doctrine were recognized in this Circuit, which it has not been, 
mere diversion, without any hint of confusion, is not enough”); Hearts on Fire Co., 
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LLC v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F.Supp.2d 274, 283 (D. Mass. 2009) (noting that initial 
interest confusion has “not been fully explored or addressed by the First Circuit”). 
C. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit  
 The Second Circuit’s formulation of initial-interest confusion conflicts with 
the panel decision. Although the circuit recognizes initial-interest confusion, the 
court in Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp. clarified that, “[b]ecause consumers diverted on 
the Internet can more readily get back on track than those in actual space, thus 
minimizing the harm to the owner of the searched-for site from consumers 
becoming trapped in a competing site, Internet initial interest confusion requires a 
showing of intentional deception.” 391 F.3d 439, 462 (2d Cir. 2004). The court 
affirmed dismissal of the trademark infringement claim on summary judgment. Id. 
The panel here, however, made no such requirement of a showing of intent. 
D. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit  
In Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth 
Circuit declined to recognize initial interest confusion. It did so again last year in a 
case strikingly similar to this one, where plaintiff “urg[ed] [the court] to only 
consider the appearance of Avance’s advertisement on the search results page[.]” 
Passport Health, LLC v. Avance Health Sys., Inc., 823 F. App’x 141, 150 (4th Cir. 
2020), as amended (Aug. 17, 2020) (emphasis added). The court in Passport 
Health noted that “Passport focuses on whether the use of its marks will lure 
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consumers to its competitor’s website, regardless of whether the content of the 
website will dispel the consumers’ confusion.” Id. It reasoned: 
[W]e have never adopted the initial interest confusion theory; rather, 
we have followed a very different mode of analysis, requiring courts 
to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists by examining 
the allegedly infringing use in the context in which it is seen by the 
ordinary consumer. Put differently, under our analysis, a court should 
not consider how closely a fragment of a given use duplicates the 
trademark, but must instead consider whether the use in its entirety 
creates a likelihood of confusion. 
 
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphases in original). The court declined 
to adopt the doctrine and considered “[defendant’s] advertisement in 
conjunction with the website to which it links.” Id. 
E. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit  
Although the Sixth Circuit recognizes initial-interest confusion, it “has been 
reluctant to extend initial-interest confusion as an actionable theory under the 
Lanham Act outside the narrow context of disputes over internet domain names.” 
Ducks Unlimited, Inc. v. Boondux, LLC, No. 214CV02885SHMTMP, 2017 WL 
3579215, at *28 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 2017) (citing Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul 
Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 551 (6th Cir. 2005)). The panel decision 
here makes no such distinction. 
F. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit recognized initial-interest confusion in Australian Gold v. 
Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2006). There, the defendants improperly 
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obtained plaintiffs’ tanning lotions and resold them on their own website; such 
passing off did not occur here. Id. at 1232–33. Further, the tanning lotion was 
inexpensive, so “the degree of care likely to be exercised in purchasing Products 
weighed in favor of Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs’ low-cost products were subject to 
impulse purchases.” Id. at 1240. Australian Gold differs from this matter and 
conflicts doctrinally with the panel decision’s application.  
Thereafter, the Tenth Circuit cast doubt on the viability of the doctrine going 
forward in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir. 
2013). In that case—again, quite similar to the instant matter—the district court 
ruled that mere use of Google Keywords, “divorced from the text of the resulting 
ads,” could not result in any likelihood of confusion. Id. Because Google users 
view only the results of searches and cannot tell which keywords advertisers 
purchase, a consumer who searches for “1-800 Contacts” and then sees an ad from 
Lens.com cannot know whether Lens.com purchased 1-800’s mark as a keyword, 
or simply the term “contacts.” Id. The Tenth Circuit then opined: 
Perhaps in the abstract, one who searches for a particular business 
with a strong mark and sees an entry on the results page will naturally 
infer that the entry is for that business. But that inference is an 
unnatural one when the entry is clearly labeled as an advertisement 
and clearly identifies the source, which has a name quite different 
from the business being searched for. 
 
Id. at 1245. This passage drew the doctrine into serious question in the Tenth 
Circuit, although ultimately, the court did not issue the formal death knell for the 
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doctrine, concluding that because the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient 
evidence of initial-interest confusion, it need not reach the question. Id. at 1243.  
G. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit has not adopted initial-interest confusion. See Suntree 
Techs., Inc. v. Ecosense Int’l, Inc., 693 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2012) (declining 
to address whether initial interest confusion is actionable in the Eleventh Circuit); 
USA Nutraceuticals Grp., Inc. v. BPI Sports, LLC, 165 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1265–66 
(S.D. Fla. 2016) (“The Court declines to adopt, at this early juncture, a yet-to-be-
recognized legal theory. Nevertheless, even assuming, arguendo, that initial 
interest confusion is a viable cause of action in the Eleventh Circuit, Beast’s use of 
the BPI Mark through the purchase of Amazon keywords does not establish such 
confusion”); Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Am. Body Bldg. Products, LLC, 511 F. Supp. 2d 
1303, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“The Eleventh Circuit has not embraced this 
principle, and I find it unpersuasive. When the bottom line is sales of a particular 
product, initial confusion prior to and concluding before the point of purchase does 
not seem dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis.”). Accordingly, the 
panel decision conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit. 
II. Adoption of the Initial-Interest Doctrine in the Context of 
Internet Marketing of Expensive Products is Bad Policy.  
 
Even if other courts do recognize the doctrine in some form, initial-interest 
confusion in the context of internet search results is inappropriate. This is in part 
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because if “the purpose of the search [truly is to look only for Plaintiffs’ goods], 
the shoppers will be attentive to click on those results that will connect them with 
sites relating to [plaintiff].” 1-800 Contacts, 722 F.3d at 1245. The consumer can 
distinguish between products, and if the consumer selects the lower-cost product, 
that does not mean that the consumer was “confused about the alternatives 
presented to her.” Hearts on Fire, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (citations omitted). 
Initial-interest confusion is particularly inapplicable here because, to constitute 
actionable infringement, the “confusion must be more than momentary and … 
must be truly costly to the consumer.” Id. at 287–88 (emphases added) (citation 
omitted). Online, “reasonable, prudent and experienced internet consumers … skip 
from site to site, ready to hit the back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a 
site’s contents. They fully expect to find some sites that aren’t what they imagine 
based on a glance at the domain name or search engine summary.… This is 
sensible agnosticism, not consumer confusion.” Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1179 (citation 
omitted). Thus, placement on a search engine’s results list is “irrelevant” when the 
website itself is non-confusing. Ascentive, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 468–469. 
Policy considerations caution against overbroad application of the initial-
interest doctrine. “Emerging trademark law doctrines have allowed trademark 
owners to excise socially beneficial content and to take unprecedented control over 
their channels of distribution. Without limits, trademark law has the capacity to 
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counterproductively destroy the Internet’s utility for everyone.” Eric Goldman, 
Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L. J. 507, 509 
(2005), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/68. Goldman notes:  
In all cases—even when the searcher has been ‘tricked’ into viewing a 
website through unscrupulous practices—a searcher’s costs to change an 
Internet search is trivial. The searcher need only hit the back button, type a 
new web address into the address bar, or select a new bookmark…The costs 
to switch a web search compare very favorably to other offline searches, 
such as using the Yellow Pages (which require extra time to dial, reach a live 
person and get questions answered) or driving around town looking driving 
around town looking for a particular item (where, if a store does not have 
what the searcher wants, the searcher must get back into the car and drive to 
the next vendor). 
 
Id. at 520–21. Goldman critiques initial-interest confusion as incorrectly 
“assum[ing] that a searcher using a trademarked keyword is looking for the 
trademarked owner.” Id. at 566. But “[s]earchers’ objectives cannot be inferred 
from the keywords they employ.” Id. He goes on to criticize Brookfield, 
concluding that “[b]ecause [initial-interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, 
defendants are virtually powerless to combat it—especially under Brookfield’s 
framework of treating any efforts to capture initial consumer attention as goodwill 
misappropriation.” Id. at 573. Goldman concludes that “[p]ushing the infringement 
determination later in the search process”—as the district court did—“will inhibit 
the speculation that can lead courts astray.” Id. at 584. 
Further, the degree of consumer care is high for expensive beds. “There is 
always less likelihood of confusion where goods are expensive and purchased after 
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careful consideration.” Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1055 
(8th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted); Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1153 
(“[W]e expect consumers searching for expensive products online to be even more 
sophisticated.”) (quotations omitted). Mattresses are not an impulse purchase 
susceptible to confusion. See, e.g. NSM Res. Corp. v. Target Corp., 636 F. Supp. 
2d 857, 868 (D. Minn. 2008) (“Shoes are not, generally, an impulse item that 
consumers take off the shelf without thought.”). Rather, they are an important 
purchase that greatly impacts a purchaser’s quality of life; even in 1957, when 
mattresses were both less expensive and less technologically advanced, the U.S. 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals concluded “that the average purchaser will 
exercise such care in the selection of a mattress as to minimize the possibility of 
confusion as to the origin of the goods.” Sleepmaster Prods. Co. v. Am. Auto-Felt 
Corp., 241 F.2d 738, 741 (C.C.P.A. 1957). Liability for initial-interest confusion in 
internet marketing ignores how consumers use search engines and the lack of harm 
caused to consumers, and it has the potential to stifle competition in online 
marketing. It is outdated and illogical, and this Court should revisit its adoption. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Dires, LLC, Scott Stenzel, and Craig Miller 
respectfully request that this Court grant their petition and rehear this case en banc. 
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